ABSTRACT. In Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them, Sainsbury and Tye argue for their Originalist theory of concepts on the basis that it solves seven well-known puzzles. These puzzles are traditionally seen as puzzles about language, and in particular puzzles concerning semantic content. Sainsbury and Tye argue that they have analogues as applied to the content of thoughts. In this paper I argue that their solution of Frege’s Identity Puzzle (from “On Sense and Reference”) is implausible, because Originalism fails to explain the difference in cognitive significance which Frege took to be the puzzling explanandum. pp. 32–41

Keywords: Sainsbury; Tye; Frege; Originalism; language; thought

How to cite: Hedger, Joseph A. (2016), “Sainsbury and Tye Fail to Solve Frege’s Puzzle,” Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 15: 32–41.

Received 6 November 2014 • Received in revised form 20 January 2015
Accepted 21 January 2015 • Available online 1 February 2016