chunk1

ABSTRACT. In this paper I adopt Kaplan’s framework for distinguishing between descriptive and expressive content. Racial slurs are an especially difficult challenge for truth-conditional semantics because of their projection behaviors. That is to say, the offensive content of slurs “scopes out” of logical operators. I argue that racial slurs express contempt and lack descriptive content, so that many sentences containing slurs are not truth apt. My theory accounts for the intuition of the ordinary speaker who refuses to assent to the truth of a sentence containing a slur, but accepts the same statement made using a neutral counterpart of that slur. Weaknesses of rival theories (including those of Williamson, Hom, and Richard) are briefly discussed. pp. 74–84

Keywords: slurs, expressivism, David Kaplan, semantics, epithets, projection

 

JOSEPH A. HEDGER
This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Department of Philosophy
Syracuse University

 
 
 

Home | About Us | Events | Our Team | Contributors | Peer Reviewers | Editing Services | Books | Contact | Online Access

© 2009 Addleton Academic Publishers. All Rights Reserved.

 
Joomla templates by Joomlashine