ABSTRACT. By thematising affirmative differences as fundamentally related to existence, this paper explores the intersection between the Deleuzian notion of ‘difference in itself’ and Heidegger’s notion of ‘ontological difference.’ It begins by examining the questions Deleuze raises in response to Heidegger’s ‘philosophy of difference.’ Deleuze asks: ‘But does [Heidegger] effectuate the conversion after which univocal Being belongs only to difference and, in this sense, revolves around being? Does he conceive of being in such a manner that it will be truly disengaged from any subordination in relation to the identity of representation? It would seem not’ (Deleuze, 1968/2010, p. 64). The paper specifically considers why representationalism poses a problem for affirmative difference by drawing on Deleuze’s terminology. It then argues that although Deleuze’s critique may appear valid with respect to Heidegger’s ontological distinction between Being and beings if the distinction is considered in isolation, it is nonetheless important to acknowledge that Heidegger himself is explicitly critical of representationalism. In its final section, the paper develops a positive account of existential difference by showing how Heideggerian Dasein can be understood as a fundamental differentiator through its existence.

Keywords: difference; existential phenomenology; Heidegger; Deleuze; affirmation

How to cite: Gahrn-Andersen, R. (2025). Difference beyond representation: Deleuze, Heidegger and existential differentiation. Knowledge Cultures, 13(3), 114–127. https://doi.org/10.22381/kc13320258

Received September 12, 2025 • Received in revised form November 7, 2025
Accepted November 7, 2025 • Available online December 1, 2025