ABSTRACT. The author gives a definition of duty and freedom. Many other normative concepts like crime, harm, guilt, punishment and justification are defined too. The aim is to define these concepts in not normative but descriptive terms. The conceptual basis of the theory is the concept of will. Nevertheless the conception is not volitional in the classic meaning, because what is basic here is the difference of wills in a group of persons (at least two), which is called a conflict. The definition is: a duty of a person in relation to a conflict is what the person has to do for the peace concluded in the conflict could last. Additionally the author presents a list of conditions which a good theory of duty is to meet and list of question which it has to answer for. In short discussion it is argued that Kant’s theory is not a good one, and that the presented theory meets all the constraints. Frankfurt’s case, supererogation and forgiveness are discussed too. pp. 102–125

Keywords: duty; freedom; conflict; peace; guilt; punishment; satisfaction; will; supererogation; forgiveness

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Institute of Philosophy,
Kazimierz Wielki University, Bydgoszcz

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