ABSTRACT. Joseph Salerno has attempted to provide an account of how anti-realist views concerning the nature of truth motivate intuitionistic revisions of logic.  I will show that Salerno’s motivations can succeed granting the principles of inference that he assumes, but that further and more epistemically immodest presuppositions will be required.  It is doubtful if a case resting upon these added presuppositions can succeed. pp. 143–153

Keywords: Salerno, antirealism, intuitionism, logical revisionism, Fitch, knowability


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