ABSTRACT. Employing recent research results covering anti-corruption investigation in China (e.g. Deng, 2018; Gang and Yano, 2017; Kim, Li, and Tarzia, 2018; Kong, Wang, and Wang, 2017; Li et al., 2017; Ying and Liu, 2018), I clarify that anti-corruption investigation is more successful when top officials are aimed at. Using data from BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research & CEIC, CCDI & Morgan Stanley Research, Eurasia Group, The Wall Street Journal, and Transparency International, I performed analyses and made estimates regarding China’s Central Communist Party inspections by institution and the number of officials disciplined and severely disciplined. Empirical and secondary data are used to support the claim that the competence of the government bureaucrats in anti-corruption agencies may have a considerable effect on the success of anti-corruption enforcement in China.
JEL codes: D73; D72; L22; L25

Keywords: anti-corruption campaign; China; political power; firm performance

How to cite: Ionescu, Luminița (2018). “Political Power, Local Government, and Firm Performance: Evidence from the Current Anti-corruption Enforcement in China,” Journal of Self-Governance and Management Economics 6(2): 119–124.

Received 22 January 2018 • Received in revised form 27 March 2018
Accepted 29 March 2018 • Available online 15 April 2018


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