ABSTRACT. My paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the electoral consequences of corruption data, periodic elections as mechanisms of democratic accountability, and the potentially adverse effect of corruption on voters’ conduct. This paper aims to analyze and discuss the impact of disclosure of corruption on turnout, the contextual circumstances that are associated with dissimilarities in corruption voting, and the separate variables that moderate the effect of political corruption on the vote choice. The results of the current study converge with prior research on the vote-sanction connection between public opinion and electoral outcomes, the consequences of corruption perceptions on the vote, and the degree to which individuals deliberately vote for a corrupt politician. The overall results provide strong evidence for the process of electoral accountability, the significance of corruption assessments in voter calculations, and the decrease in corruption practices generated by electoral accountability. pp. 63–68
JEL codes: D72; D73

Keywords: electoral accountability; vote choice; political corruption

How to cite: Ionescu, Luminita (2015), “Electoral Accountability and Political Corruption,” Economics, Management, and Financial Markets 10(3): 63–68.

Received 10 November 2014 • Received in revised form 12 May 2015
Accepted 18 May 2015 • Available online 20 September 2015