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ABSTRACT. Wittgenteinian quietism can be seen as a rejection of two opposing approaches to metaphysical theorising. Conceptual realism, on the one hand, sees our concept scheme as being one particular view on some super-conceptual or god-eye view of reality. Conceptual idealism, on the other hand, rejects this conceptual relativism: nothing can exist that doesn’t fall under some possible concept, one which could be brought within our conceptual repertoire. Both these approaches assume some connection between our concepts and the nature of ‘reality’ (in some metaphysically significant sense), that is rejected by quietism. While this paper does not argue for quietism with respect to philosophical theorising in general, it attempts to show how a quietist approach might be appropriate for a particular area of philosophical discourse. It illustrates the application of a quietist analysis with respect to the notions of ‘qualia’ and subjectivity, and tries to show how this approach is distinct from mere elimination of the disputed concepts.

 

MATTHEW J. DENSLEY
 
 
 

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