ABSTRACT. In reference to three competing negative principles of freedom (non-frustration, non-interference, and non-domination), Philip Pettit recently presented an argument in favor of the absolute prioritization of non-domination. I refute the absolute priority claim on both analytical and contextual grounds and prove that none of these principles is superior to the others. The contextual analysis shows that partial priority claims are unsuitable for the respective historical and theoretical contexts. The formal analysis demonstrates that the absolute priority claim is logically deficient. Rehabilitation of the non-frustration principle entails that more attention should be paid to human individuality. Additionally, my findings give rise to new theoretical conditions whereby we must make sense of the plurality of liberty principles. I suggest that we are bound to return to the pre-Berlinian state of affairs. pp. 108–131

Keywords: freedom; liberty; non-domination; non-interference; non-frustration; liberalism; republicanism

How to cite: Gloukhov, Alexei (2016), “Non-priority of the Freedom Principles: Non-frustration, Non-interference, Non-domination,” Review of Contemporary Philosophy 15: 108–131.

Received 23 November 2015 • Received in revised form 9 March 2016
Accepted 10 March 2016 • Available online 15 July 2016