ABSTRACT. It might well seem that individuals of some kinds have haecceitas or thisness, which makes them different, from other individuals of the same kind otherwise indistinguishable from them. In the first part of this paper I seek to make the notion of thisness more precise, and I then go on to consider which kinds of individuals have thisness. I shall unhesitantly suggest that abstract objects, places, and times do not. I shall hesitantly suggest that material objects do not. I shall confidently suggest that animate beings (such as humans) and also conscious events which involve them do have thisness; and I shall hesitantly suggest that all other events also have thisness. These suggestions will be backed up by arguments, but inevitably my discussion will raise many other central philosophical questions which a paper such as this cannot discuss adequately. The point of the paper is, however, to show how different answers to these questions are connected to each other by the central notion of thisness; and to show how the grounds for ascribing thisness to individuals of one kind interact with the grounds for ascribing it to individuals of another kind.



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