ABSTRACT. This paper examines the reforms and institutions that have, anecdotally and empirically, demonstrated progress in combating corruption in Brazil. Focusing specifically on the institutions charged with investigating suspected corrupt activities, we contend that institutional multiplicity – the overlap of investigative functions among various governmental entities – has strengthened outcomes by allowing in- stitutions to collaborate, to complement one another, or to compensate for one another’s deficiencies or oversights. We further argue that our analysis of the Brazilian experience reveals the advantages in pursuing alternative institutional approaches, including institutional multiplicity combined with institutional malleability, in developing strategies to reduce corruption. pp. 34–71
JEL codes: K42

Keywords: corruption; Brazil; institutional multiplicity; accountability mechanisms; institutions

How to cite: Mota Prado, Mariana, and Lindsey Carson (2016), “Brazilian Anti-Corruption Legislation and Its Enforcement: Potential Lessons for Institutional Design,” Journal of Self-Governance and Management Economics 4(1): 34–71.

Received 20 April 2015 • Received in revised form 23 June 2015
Accepted 24 June 2015 • Available online 15 September 2015

doi:10.22381/JSME4120162