ABSTRACT. The analysis presented in this paper contributes to research on the consequences of electoral systems on corruption, the electoral impunity of corrupt governments and politicians, the impacts of competitiveness on liability and corruption, and the adverse economic effects of political corruption. The paper generates insights about the circumstances under which individuals hold elected politicians responsible for corruption, the impact of corruption information on electors’ positions and conduct, the pivotal workings in guaranteeing accountability and moderating corruption, and the link between party system consequences and corruption. The findings of this study have implications for the manner citizens assess politicians impeached for corruption, the association between corruption and party system competitiveness, and the electoral effects of corruption. pp. 61–68
JEL codes: D72; D73

Keywords: electoral system; corrupt politician; party system competitiveness; elector

How to cite: Ionescu, Luminita (2015), “Why Do Electors Support Corrupt Politicians?” Economics, Management, and Financial Markets 10(4): 61–68.

Received 12 March 2015 • Received in revised form 14 October 2015
Accepted 15 October 2015 • Available online 14 December 2015

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